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Abstract: An independent director system has been a part of the Chinese corporate 
governance structure for more than a decade, but it fails to play its key role in 
monitoring because it is suffering a number of problems and obstacles. The current 
Chinese corporate governance reforms cannot be achieved without removing the 
weaknesses and defects in the existing independent director system. 
1. Introduction 
In 1940, Investment Company Act was announced in America, which symbolized the 
birth of the Independent Director System (IDS). 1On the basis of trusteeship2 , 
American law rules that directors of a company shall bear strict responsibilities for 
their corporate governance, which refers to the dual duties of being fiduciary and 
diligent. Meanwhile, due to the developed outside supervision of stock market in 
America, it was unnecessary for US companies to have board of supervisors together 
with the board of directors under the meetings of stockholders. Under such condition, 
to realize the balance of powers among the manageable structures of an American 
company and to maximize its efficiency, progressives from the political and economic 
communities managed to establish a new system to make outsiders take part in the 
companies’ management, supervising the processes of dealing with daily affairs and 
decision-making. These outsider supervisors were finally called independent directors. 
The relevant system was also set up after that. 
 
In China, this system started with the release of Suggestions Regarding Further 
Standardizing the Operations and Intensifying Reform of Companies Listed outside 
China (the “Suggestions”) by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1999, which required that all 
                                                             
1 The Investment Company Act of 1940 is an act of Congress. It was passed as a United States Public Law on 
August 22, 1940, and is codified at 15 U.S.C.. 
2 In common law legal systems, a trust is a relationship whereby property is held by one party for the benefit of 
another. A trust is created by a settlor, who transfers some or all of his or her property to a trustee. The trustee 
holds that property for the trust’s beneficiaries. Trusts have existed since Roman times and have become one of the 
most important innovations in property law. See Austin Scott, “Importance of the Trust” (2014) 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
177.  
companies located in China but listed overseas shall have their systems of 
independent director. However, in 1997, CSRC had already mentioned it in Guideline 
Concerning Articles of Association of Listed Companies (the “Guideline”). Then 
CSRC issued Guidance Opinions Regarding the Establishment of the Independent 
Directors System in Listed Companies (the “Opinions”) in 2001 to formally establish 
this system in China, making it indispensable in all listed companies, whether in or 
outside China. The “Opinions” offered a number of particular processes and terms to 
support such a system.3 . And in 2002, Corporate Governance Code of Listed 
Companies (the “Code”) was announced by SETC and CSRC to set the minimum 
standard that one third directors in a listed company shall be independent. These two 
documents, the “Opinions” and the “Code”, are pioneer official announcements on 
corporate governance in the PRC.4 After them, the Provisions on Strengthening the 
Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public Shareholders (the 
“Provisions”) in 2004 made an affirmation of the system’s status in the governance 
structures of Chinese listed corporations again. In fact, one of the purposes to 
establish IDS in China is to weaken the bad effects caused by the large proportion of 
stated owned shares in listed companies, because there are plenty of obstacles in the 
way of lowering such proportion.5At the end of 2012, there are 5,972 in-service 
independent directors in 2,494 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in total.6  
2. Current predicament: “Dependent” directors in China  
Graph 1: The number of companies for which the in-service independent directors 
work in China in 2012 
                                                             
3 Yuan Zhao, “Independent directors in China: the path in which direction?” (2011) 22 International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 352. 
4 Alex K.L. Lau, “China: CSRC's ‘Guiding Opinion’ on independent directors of listed companies - another first 
for China” (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 279. 
5 Lilian Miles and Miao He, “Protecting the rights and interests of minority shareholders in listed companies in 
China: challenges for the future” (2005) 16 International Company and Commercial Law Review 275. 
6 The research group of A Guide Compiled by CAPCO, “There is Still a Long Way to Go for the Independent 
Director System in China”, China Securities Journal, 16th Jan, 2014. 
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Among all, 4,520 directors, which is 75.7%, only work in single listed company, 922 
of them work for two companies, namely 15.4%, and 52, take such position in 5 
companies simultaneously.7 
Graph 2: Education background of independent directors in China in 2012  
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About the education background, those who are bachelors take up 28.8%, and 
directors who are masters or above take up 61.1%. Meanwhile, directors who are only 
educated in junior college or below also exists.8 
 
Graph 3: a survey in 2003 
                                                             
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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As the graph 3 above indicates, among all questioned ones, 37% believed that they do 
perform their duties, 39% defined themselves as consultants, while 2% of them 
thought that they were merely “ornamental” in a survey in 2003 on the roles of 
independent directors. And in 2011, it was found that only 4% independent directors 
had queried proposals of board of directors, worrying any adverse effects of them 
such as harming shareholders’ interests or risking to make investments in a project 
supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), whose authors 
are from PKU, UIBE and other top universities in China.9 Meanwhile, another study 
of 2006 shows that there is no strong link between independent directors and 
corporate performance in China.10  
The most significant value of the IDS is the independence of these directors, which 
guarantees them to do their duties without being interfered by other powerful 
shareholders or directors, while in China, this value is always decreased. Traditionally, 
the only practical option for minority shareholders to voice their disagreements with 
the management and policies of the company was to sell their shares in the company11. 
To avoid this kind of situation, IDS makes sense. However, why did things turn to be 
so different from the imagination of legislators at the time of law making? The 
reasons are complicated.  
2.1 What makes them dependent? 
Generally speaking, people who take the positions of independent directors in a 
company shall be those who are skilled at some professions12, so that they are able to 
                                                             
9 Kangtao Ye, Jigao Zhu, Zhengfei Lu and Zhang Ran, “The Independence of Independent Directors: Evidence 
from Board Voting Behavior” (2011) 1 Economic Researches 126. 
10 Donald C. Clarke, “The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance” (2006) 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 
125. 
11 Patricia Wong and Colin Law, “Corporate governance: a comparative analysis between the UK and China” 
(2005) 16 International Company and Commercial Law Review 350. 
12 As is mentioned in the text, they need to have at least five years’ working experience in certain fields, such as 
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make independent statements in the company’s decision making processes and 
represent the interests of a number of minor shareholders, counterbalancing the 
influence of major shareholders on the board of directors, competently and 
responsibly. Some possible factors led to the loss of independence. 
2.1.1 The lack of sense of responsibility 
One of the board secretaries’ key tasks in China is to take flights to get their 
independent directors’ signatures on the meeting records of the board, which 
ironically fits the truth told by Mace in 1986.13 Another report also showed that the 
independent directors of almost all investigated or censured listed companies in 2008 
had not made any difference in advance.14 
In fact, some political or economic celebrities, like retired officials, are invited by the 
directors or senior managers to take the independent directors’ positions.15 7/48 
independent shareholders of the top 10 Chinese listed companies used to be 
government officials in 2013.16 For the listed companies, these celebrity directors 
help build up their social images, which is not only diligent and admirable but also 
“socially worthwhile”. Thus, these celebrities, as independent directors, only appear 
in a few events, such as ribbon-cutting and groundbreaking ceremonies, and do not 
take their responsibilities in improving corporate governance. Xu Jingchang, the one 
who was called “the top independent director in China”, used to take such positions in 
6 Chinese listed companies at the same time in 2013,17 even if CSRC has regulated 
that one can be the independent director of at most 5 companies simultaneously. Many 
people queried if he really performed all his duties.  
2.1.2 Personal incompetence 
In the meantime, although the IDS is set to get independent statements from the 
independent directors based on their own fields, some of them, besides those 
celebrities without any professional background, seem to focus too much on their 
professions without any basic knowledge about corporate operations. Ironically, they 
even dare not sign any resolutions. Those listed companies who want to circumvent 
                                                                                                                                                                              
law and economics. 
13 Kangtao Ye, Jigao Zhu, Zhengfei Lu, and Ran Zhang, “The Independence of Independent Directors: Evidence 
from Board Voting Behavior” (2011) 1 Economic Researches 126. 
14 Wang Miao, “To Independent Directors: How Do You Work As ‘Vases’ of Decoration?”, China Reform Report, 
11th Jun, 2012. 
15 He Dong, “The Independent Directors Are Not Independent: the System Development Deviated from Reality” 
(2010) Technology in Western China 67. 
16 Junsheng Zhou, “The Independent Director System in Form must be modified”, Xinhua Daily Telegraph, 13th 
Aug, 2013. 
17 Ibid. 
the supervisory functions of IDS may recruit only technicians as their independent 
directors somehow.  
What is more, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) studied that every independent 
director in a Chinese company may be involved in many of the functional committees, 
such as audit committee, which takes them lots of time. Once they cannot have a good 
knowledge of what they need to do, the roles of these committees would not be played 
well.18 
2.1.3 Personal relations or nepotism 
Those celebrity directors are inevitably connected to some entities, including the 
government. In addition, since state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the overwhelming 
majority of Chinese listed companies, there are many problems like the absence of the 
representative of asset owners, insider control, major shareholders’ control over the 
shareholders’ meeting in these enterprises. Some senior managers or directors make 
many of their relatives or friends who own a wide social affection become the 
independent directors in their own companies, which causes these directors plenty of 
difficulties in being objective when expressing their opinions and fulfilling their 
duties. In 2013, 90% of independent directors in Chinese listed companies are 
nominated by their largest shareholders.19 Therefore, their attitude towards these 
shareholders is subtle. 
2.1.4 Unfair elections 
In China, even if the Company Law provides that a shareholder who holds more than 
5% issued shares of a listed company is entitled to nominate candidates of 
independent directors in the shareholders’ assembly of the company, under most 
circumstances, the minor shareholders hardly exercise this power about electing the 
persons who represent their interests for some reason or another, such as the lack of 
relevant consciousness or conditions. Furthermore, most of the considerable powers 
are under the control of major shareholders or powerful interest groups. Some 
sampling investigation made by specialists shows that those who are present in 
shareholders’ meetings are almost major ones and members of powerful groups, 
leading such meetings and independent directors to be controlled by them. And the 
more shareholders of a company have, the more medium and small ones unwilling to 
                                                             
18 Yufan Luo, Yichen Yang, Yedi Hua, “Independent Directors Are Hardly Independent: A System in Form”, 
Xinhua Daily Telegraph, 19th Aug 2013. 
19 Ibid. 
vote.20 Resulted from that, after the elections, those nominated directors are still on 
behalf of these groups as a matter of fact. 
2.2 The results of being “dependent” 
As is said, the problems in the elections of independent directors directly prevent 
these nominees from representing the minority shareholders’ interests, and the 
processes of decision making and executing are finally determined by powerful 
groups. The ultimate causes are in the medium and small shareholders themselves 
because mostly they give up or negatively exercise such nominating powers because 
of certain difficulties. Even if in recent years, minor shareholders seems not to be so 
indifferent to these elections, there are still many obstacles for them in exercising their 
rights, such as they cannot obtain the same quantity of information and news related 
to the nominees and the company as major shareholders. There is sometimes 
substantial delay in the implementation of major plans, as shareholders usually 
consult directors before making strategic decisions.21 
The international comparison report about the statistical data of international 
enterprises in 1999 by OECD22 showed that the percentages of independent directors 
in all members of director boards in British, French and US companies are 
respectively 34%, 29% and 62%. In Chinese listed companies, it is regulated that one 
third of the members are independent, which is slightly less than British percentage, 
but greatly lower than the one of USA. When such one third independent directors are 
mostly made up with “vase”, “dependent” ones, the voices from the minority are more 
easily ignored or neglected by the majority.  
3. Theoretical and legislative foundations 
3.1 Theory of Principal and Agent 
An independent director of a listed company means one who does not take up any 
other positions in his company, also he does not have a certain relationship, which 
may prevent him from being independent and objective, with the listed company or its 
                                                             
20 Qingyuan Wu, “On the Innovation of the Election System of Independent Directors” (2011) 8 China Economic 
& Trade Herald 58. 
21 Patricia Wong and Colin Law, “Corporate governance: a comparative analysis between the UK and China” 
(2005) 16 International Company and Commercial Law Review 350. 
22 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (French: Organisation de coopération 
et de développement économiques, OCDE) is an international economic organisation of 34 countries founded in 
1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. It is a forum of countries describing themselves as 
committed to democracy and the market economy, providing a platform to compare policy experiences, seeking 
answers to common problems, identify good practices and coordinate domestic and international policies of its 
members. OECD.org - OECD http://www.oecd.org/. 
major shareholders.23 An independent director, outside director, or non-executive 
director takes neither another manageable positions nor professionally connected with 
the management of the company. Meanwhile, he would make independent judgments 
according to his personal career representing the interests of medium and small 
shareholders. According to the “Guidelines” promulgated by the CSRC, an 
independent director is defined as a director who assumes only a directorship position 
in a company and has no other relations with the company or with the major 
shareholders, which may adversely affect his independent and objective judgment.24  
All these versions of definition implies the same points: the first is that an 
independent director only takes this position in certain company; the second is that 
there should not be any relationship between this director and his company or major 
shareholders that may do harm to his independence; and the third point is the 
judgment made by an independent director should be independent and objective. And 
it need be noticed that in the definition of the “Guidelines”, the word “interfere” is 
explained as “adversely affect”. 
The IDS was originally established in America in order to improve the corporate 
governance in a modern company, strengthening the functions of the board of 
directors. The most typical characteristics of modern enterprises are their clearly 
established ownership and well defined powers and responsibilities, which means the 
shareholders, as the owners of a corporation, shall not be its senior managers, like 
directors, at the same time. Theory of Principal and Agent25 provides to make sure 
that the owners of an enterprise give the rights of management to a team of managers 
voluntarily and the acts of the managers do not deviate from the shareholders’ will; 
meanwhile, to prevent the insider control, the IDS must be set up to better and 
supervise decision makings in the course of corporate governance, balancing the 
powers of different departments in a same company. As a result, both parties, the 
owners and the managers, in the relation of Principal and Agent, will benefit from this 
“separation of ownership and control”.  
IDS makes sense in protecting the interests of minority shareholders in China, even if 
the obvious feature of “separation of ownership and control” is the absence of a 
                                                             
23 Dong He, “The Independent Directors Are Not Independent: the System Development Deviated From Reality” 
(2010) Technology in Western China 67. 
24 Patricia Wong and Colin Law, “Corporate governance: a comparative analysis between the UK and China” 
(2005) 16 International Company and Commercial Law Review 350. 
25 The principal–agent problem or agency dilemma occurs when one person or entity (the “agent”) is able to make 
decisions that impact, or on behalf of, another person or entity: the “principal”. The dilemma exists because 
sometimes the agent is motivated to act in his own best interests rather than those of the principal. The 
agent-principal relationship is a useful analytic tool in political science and economics, but may also apply to other 
areas. Common examples of this relationship include corporate management (agent) and shareholders (principal), 
or politicians (agent) and voters (principal). K Eisenhardt, “Agency theory: An assessment and review” (1989) 14 
Academy of Management Review 57. 
controlling shareholder.26 In some countries like German and Japan, such controlling 
shareholders are really common.27 Considering the factual situations in China, in 
many listed companies transformed from SOEs, the state has become the controlling 
shareholder28, even in some other companies, the controlling shareholders are also 
really common. Although these majority shareholders ought to keep their eyes on the 
corporate governance and daily business to guarantee their own benefits, it does not 
mean the interests of minority can also be protected by the way. If the control of the 
majority is powerful enough, independent directors are still necessary in preventing 
the exploitation by the controlling shareholders. Thus independent directors play the 
role of an “accountability link” between the shareholders and the management, and 
they should keep a close watch on the performance of the latter.29 
3.2 Qualifications and disqualifications of being an independent director in China 
The second article of the “Opinions” released on 16th August of 2001 by CSRC gives 
the details of being an independent director, which regulates that if a person wants to 
be an independent director in a Chinese listed company, he shall:  
a) satisfy all requirements of being a director of a listed company in the law, 
administrative regulations and other relevant provisions in force, usually such 
requirements are only being an adult and consents;  
b) be of independence in accordance with this “Opinions” ;  
c) have a basic knowledge of the operation of a listed company and relevant law, 
administrative regulations, by-laws and rules;  
d) have at least five years’30 experience in working in the field of law, economics or 
so;  
e) satisfy other requirements in the articles of association of the company in question.  
                                                             
26 Yuan Zhao, “Independent directors in China: the path in which direction?” (2011) 22 International Company 
and Commercial Law Review 352. 
27 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership around the World” 
(1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471. 
28 Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China (London: Routledge, 1998), p.13; Guy S. Liu and Pei Sun, 
“The Class of Shareholdings and its Impact on Corporate Performance: A Case of State Shareholding Composition 
in Chinese Public Corporations” (2005) 13 Corporate Governance 46; Wei Cai, “Path Dependence and 
Concentration of Ownership and Control of Companies Listed in China” (2009) 20 International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 281, at 285-287. 
29 Yuan Zhao, “Independent directors in China: the path in which direction?” (2011) 22 International Company 
and Commercial Law Review 352. 
30 The original text literally means all there conditions must be satisfied at the same time, but logically thinking, it 
should mean that any of the conditions is satisfied. 
Meanwhile, its third article rules that these natural persons cannot be the independent 
directors if they: 
a) are the employees of a listed company or its subsidiary companies, or the direct 
relatives31 or major social relations32 of such employees;  
b) are the shareholders holding more than one percent of the issued shares of a listed 
company directly or indirectly or being the top ten natural person shareholders of a 
listed company or their direct relatives;  
c) are the employees of the entities directly or indirectly holding more than five 
percent of the issued shares of a listed company or of the top five entity shareholders 
of a listed company or their direct relatives;  
d) used to be a), b) or c) in the last year;33  
e) are the financial, legal or consultant service providers of a listed company or its 
subsidiary companies;  
f) are other natural persons laid down in the articles of association;  
g) are other natural persons designated in the legal documents of CSRC.  
4. The comparison between IDS and the board of supervisors（BOS） 
In China, the supervisory system in a listed company involves both BOS and the IDS, 
so they are competing mechanisms to some degree, particularly in their functions. 34 
But in practice, both systems have their own meanings. Here is the comparison. 
4.1 Differences 
The differences between BOS and IDS are as follows: 
Firstly, the supervision of BOS is internal for the corporate governance of a company, 
                                                             
31 The direct relatives are a person’s spouse, parents and heirs. 
32 The major social relations of a person involve siblings and their spouses, parents and children in law, and 
siblings of spouse. 
33 The original text literally means all there conditions must be satisfied at the same time, but logically thinking, it 
should mean that any of the conditions is satisfied. 
34 To balance the powers in corporate governance, the German mode makes the board of supervisors parallel with 
the board of directors under the shareholders’ meeting; while the American mode establish the independent 
director system instead of BOS. But in China, both BOS and independent directors are in listed companies, which 
is because the BOS was too weak to balance the powers in a company before establishing the system of 
independent directors. 
mainly serving as moral constraints35 to all management staff, as some people said, it 
acts as a primary internal monitoring institution 36 ; while independent directors 
exercise external supervision since they are outsiders of the company’s management, 
providing their professional suggestions as the independent statements in the course 
of business running. The second provision of article 117 of China’s Company Law 
rules that “The board of supervisors shall include representatives of shareholders and 
an appropriate percentage of representatives of the company's employees. The 
percentage of the representatives of employees shall account for no less than 1/3 of all 
the supervisors, but the concrete percentage shall be specified in the bylaw. The 
representatives of employees who serve as members of the board of supervisors shall 
be democratically elected through the assembly of representatives of the company's 
employees, the shareholders' meeting or by other means.” 37  Judging from this 
provision, most of BOS members are insiders of a company who are quite familiar 
with its manageable affairs, which explains why the board is in the internal 
supervision system. However, people who are able to take the positions of 
independent directors shall be professionals in certain fields, like lawyers, accountants 
and scholars. As a result, their supervision can be of expertise and externality.  
Secondly, as an internal organization of a company, BOS supervises every aspects of 
the daily operations of a company,38 while the independent statements are only given 
to the significant processes39. 
                                                             
35 Yangping Qinyi: “On how to improve the Independent Director System in China” (2010) Journal of Shandong 
Youth Administrative Cadres College 121. 
36 Eddy Wymeersch, “A Status Report on Corporate Governance Rules and Practices in Some Continental 
European States” , in Klaus Hopt et al. (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: The Status of the Art and 
Emerging Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.1078. 
37 See Art. 117 of Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2013 Amendment). 
38 See Art. 53 of Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2013 Amendment): 
The board of supervisors or supervisor of a company with no board of supervisors may exercise the following 
powers: 
(1)To check the financial affairs of the company; 
(2)To supervise the duty-related acts of the directors and senior managers, to put forward proposals on the removal 
of any director or senior manager who violates any law, administrative regulation, the bylaw or any resolution of 
the shareholders’ meeting; 
(3)To demand any director or senior manager to make corrections if his act has injured the interests of the 
company; 
(4)To propose to call interim shareholders’ meetings, to call and preside over shareholders’ meetings when the 
board of directors does not exercise the function of calling and presiding over shareholders’ meetings as prescribed 
in this Law; 
(5)To put forward proposals at shareholders’ meetings; 
(6)To initiate actions against directors or senior managers according to Article 152 of this Law; and 
(7)Other duties as provided for by the bylaw. 
39 See Art. 5 of the “Opinion”: the Responsibilities of an independent director: 
 (a) after the independent director recognises a significant connected transaction (this means when the listed 
company and a connected person intend to enter into a related transaction whose total amount is over RMB 3 
million or over 5 per cent of the listed company's latest audited net asset value), the transaction should be 
submitted to the board of directors for discussion. Before the independent director makes a judgment, he can retain 
a referral organisation to present an independent financial consultation report, to be used as the basis for making 
his judgment; 
Thirdly, concerning the legal hierarchy, BOS is regulated by the law in detail, 
especially in its functions; but article 122 of the Company Law only rules that “A 
listed company shall have independent directors. The concrete measures shall be 
formulated by the State Council.” And indeed almost all the rules or regulations are 
about IDS in China are provided by CSRC and SETC.  
4.2 Similarities 
Firstly, regarding social relations, many supervisory directors have strong affiliations 
with majority shareholders and the government, so do independent directors,40 even if 
they shall not have these relations according to the law. 
Secondly, although the responsibilities of BOS and independent directors are 
complementary to each other in the supervision system of a company in theory, there 
are still conflicts between them in practice. The second provision in article 53 of 
Company law requires BOS “[t]o supervise the duty-related acts of the directors and 
senior managers, to put forward proposals on the removal of any director or senior 
manager who violates any law, administrative regulation, the bylaw or any resolution 
of the shareholders' meeting”41. And the article 49, 50, 52 and 54 of the “Code” all 
regulates that independent directors have the powers of monitoring the financial 
affairs, corporate business and personnel, recognizing connected transactions and 
doing other illegal operations in the company. Accordingly, financial affairs of the 
company are concerned by both systems. Besides, article 55 of this “Code” 
empowers independent directors to give their professional opinions to the board of 
directors in the company when making important decisions, to scrutinize and to 
comment on the nominees of directors and managers. Meanwhile, in its article 53 and 
article 151, Company Law authorizes BOS to make motions about personnel and 
lodge actions against directors and senior managers who have violated the law or 
other regulations. So another conflict between the two supervision systems’ 
responsibilities lies in personnel affairs. In short, at least in supervising financial and 
personnel operations, the powers of BOS and IDS are overlapped. 
Some people believe this “double-check”, namely the coexistence of BOS and IDS, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(b) making suggestion to the board of directors to retain or fire an accounting firm ; 
(c) to request the board of directors to convene an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting ; 
(d) to suggest the convening of a board of directors’ meeting; 
(e) to independently retain external auditing organisations and consultation organisations; 
(f) before the commencement of a shareholders' meeting to openly accumulate voting rights from shareholders. 
40 Q. Qiang, “Corporate governance in state owned shares in China listed companies” (2003) 14 Journal of Asian 
Economics 771, at  777-778; and J. Dahya, Y. Karbhari, and J.Z.Z. Xiao, “The Supervisory Board in Chinese 
Listed Companies: Problems, Causes, Consequences and Remedies” (2003) 9 Asia Pacific Business Review 118, at  
125 and 126. 
41 Ibid. 
can work better than abandoning either of them, but in fact, it is more possible to 
cause inefficiency and conflicts between the two. To better exercise the functions of 
both two systems, perhaps it would be more efficient to make a clearer division 
between their powers by legislation or in other ways. 
5. The possibilities of bettering IDS in China 
The problems of Chinese IDS could be solved from four perspectives. 
5.1 From the elections 
To make medium and small shareholders take part in the processes of election, the 
following ways could be taken into consideration:  
First, it may help to make name lists of potential nominees and oversee the elections. 
On the one hand, some governmental department, like CSRC or SETC, can make 
name lists of persons who are competent in exercising the responsibilities of 
independent directors in different fields and repeatedly renew such lists, just like the 
name lists of arbitrators provided by CIETAC42 and other boards of arbitration and 
the Director’s Registry Candidate Match of the National Association of Corporate 
Directors. Certainly, the very nominees of a company should be decided by 
themselves considering plenty of factors, especially the social relations of these 
people. On the other hand, the governmental department, like CSRC, can also 
supervise the processes as the “Opinions” rules that the CSRC has the right to veto 
these appointments of independent directors. If there is any illegal nomination noticed 
by or reported to its officials, they could require the company in question to make 
corrections, or it would be punished according to some law or regulations. 
Second, cumulative voting system could be adopted in the elections. Article 31 of the 
Code provides: “The election of directors shall fully reflect the opinions of minority 
shareholders. A cumulative voting system shall be earnestly advanced in shareholders' 
meetings for the election of directors. Listed companies that are more than 30% 
owned by controlling shareholders shall adopt a cumulative voting system, and the 
companies that do adopt such system shall stipulate the implementing rules for such 
cumulative voting system in their articles of association.” Through this system, 
minority shareholders may be able to ensure the election of their candidates as 
                                                             
42 The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) is one of the major permanent 
arbitration institutions in the world. CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION http://www.cietac.org/index.cms. 
directors by concentrating their votes on one or a small number of directors.43  
Third, companies could organize election committees in their governance structure, 
then hold preliminary selections and recruitment. Every listed company can establish 
a special committee made up of minor shareholders to nominate independent directors. 
Before the elections in the shareholders’ meetings, this committee can have some 
pre-discussions about the candidates who are on behalf of them. And it is also able to 
have a preliminary selection and recruitment before the formal election in the 
shareholders’ meeting. The professional skills, reputations and personal relationship 
of all participants shall be filtrated and scrutinized strictly. Comparing all of these 
conditions comprehensively, the candidates they would like to nominate in the 
shareholders’ meeting can be finally defined.  
Fourth, voting technologies will enhance the efficiency and convenience. To make it 
easier for medium and small shareholders to enforce their powers, some modern 
technologies, especially information related ones, can be used in the elections of 
independent directors. For example, companies can make some webpages about these 
elections on the internet and inform their shareholders, who are entitled to vote, of the 
time, website and other details through all kinds of media. The “Provisions” also 
suggested companies to adapt new ways of voting online in order to encourage 
individual shareholders to exercise their powers.44 In 2005, Notice of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission on Piloting the Share-trading Reform of Listed 
Companies45  issued by CSRC and Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Electronic Signature have also justify this way of voting, which lowers the expenses 
comparing traditional ones as well. Of course, there are still two points about online 
voting should be emphasized. One is that the security of this method need to be 
guaranteed by the companies or even government in case that some people want to 
control or change the results; and another is that the identities of those entitled to vote 
should be defined and scrutinized somehow. 
Fifth, it is necessary to comply with the law strictly and dismiss or transform 
“dependent” directors timeously. The qualifications and disqualifications of taking the 
positions of independent directors need be known more clearly and carried out more 
accurately. According to the current rules, direct relatives and major social relations of 
a listed company’s senior managers or directors cannot take the positions of 
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independent directors in this company. But in practice, “major social relations” may 
involve more than its present regulated meanings. And although such rules are 
announced, they are always not obeyed for the reasons explained in the former text. 
Another kind of directors have lost their independence after they take this position for 
two or more years. Both of these two types shall be dismissed timely, and for the 
former, such dismissal is a remedy because they have already been disqualified from 
the beginning. The relevant motions ought to be put forward by the committee of 
minority shareholders mentioned in the third point to make sure their own interests. 
What’s more, for the latter, considering their knowledge about their companies, they 
are able to be transformed into other directors after being not independent to make 
more contributions to their companies in other ways. As the result of losing 
independence, the term of six years ruled in the article 4 in the “Opinions” should not 
be treated rigidly; therefore it can be understood as “for at most six years”. 
5.2 From the duties and obligations 
It has been noticed that it is really difficult to find any law or regulations about what 
punishment shall be given if an independent director cannot fulfill his duties, thus 
making the way of getting awarded or punished clear may help to encourage 
independent directors. The first article of the “Opinions” requires “independent 
directors of a listed company to carry out fiduciary and diligent duties towards the 
company and its shareholders; to take their responsibilities carefully, preserving the 
whole corporate interests, especially the legitimate interests of minority shareholders; 
not to be adversely influenced in the course of implementing their duties by the 
majority shareholders, the real controller, other people or institutions of his major 
social relations; to take this position in at most five different companies whose 
shareholders are different, making sure themselves enough time and energy in 
exercising their duties in every company”. Seeing this together with other laws and 
regulations, it can be noticed that there is no extra obligation or punishment about the 
infringement of independent directors’ responsibilities ruled in China so far. Besides, 
most independent directors have limited personal belongings and their positions are 
not full-time. These factors work together to prevent them from being liable for their 
illegal or improper operations. Hence it is necessary to establish a system to define the 
possible adverse results they might get. Such system can also function with the 
relevant liability insurance system mentioned by CSRC to not only improve their 
sense of responsibility but also offer them some remedies when there is any risk. 
5.3 From the distribution and cooperation between the internal and external 
supervision 
Since it is known that both supervisors and independent directors have the power of 
monitoring some common affairs in a company’s governance, a clearer distribution of 
their lines of duties is necessary to make them work together for the improvement of 
efficiency, from the perspectives of both insiders and outsiders, as is analyzed in 4.2. 
Also it is known that BOS generally focuses more on the financial issues, and 
independent directors pay more attention to the processes of decision making.  
There is another suggestion that supervisors and independent directors can have 
periodical joint meetings or conferences to share the information from each other, so 
that independent directors can make more sense when expressing their professional 
opinions. The reason is that any listed company should guarantee their independent 
directors to have the access to information as other directors.46  
5.4 From the remuneration 
Graph 4: Annual remuneration of independent directors in China in 2003 
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Graph 5: Annual remuneration of independent directors in China in 2012 
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Korn-Ferry concluded that in 1995, the average remuneration of American 
independent directors is nearly forty thousand dollars.47 And according to some 
researches in 2003, they receive twenty to forty thousand every year and one to five 
thousand every time they take part in a meeting of the board of directors as the extra 
allowances. Meanwhile, in China, 31% of all independent directors earn 40 to 60 
thousand dollars, and 50% earn 20 to 40 thousand as Graph 4 shows. In 2012, such 
statistics are different, 50% of all in-service ones could get 60 thousand or above, 
among them, the annual earnings of 20% are more than 120 thousand.48 
It is found that the remuneration package of many independent directors does not 
work as an effective stimulus to their diligent performance.49 The “Opinions” has 
already regulated that “listed companies shall give their independent directors some 
reimbursement that has been budgeted and proposed by the board of directors, 
deliberated, examined and approved by the shareholders’ meeting and disclosed to the 
public in the corporate annual reports. Except for such reimbursement, the other 
undisclosed interests or benefits from the company, big shareholders or other 
organizations and persons of major social relations cannot be accepted by independent 
directors”.  
In 2012, Ye Tan, a well-known Chinese financial commentator, was employed by a 
company “*ST 50  Tian Mu” and voluntarily decrease his own yearly pretax 
allowances to the 20% of the ordinary amount of what the other independent directors 
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get, which means 100 thousand RMB, in the same company.51 But since not everyone 
can be Ye Tan, as part of the encouragement to people who work as independent 
directors, it is still really necessary to give them appropriate remunerations to keep 
them do their duties responsibly and actively.  
Because independent directors enjoy the powers of supervising the corporate 
governance of directors and senior managers, their salaries should not be decided by 
those people they supervise. Or, they are factually under the control of these 
supervisees. Namely, the more money they get from supervisees, the less motivation 
they have to handle their responsibilities. Based on this point, the committee of 
nominating independent directors mentioned before, or the law is able to determine 
the methods of calculating salaries or allowances of independent directors in every 
single company. In addition, how diligent an independent director is, how much time 
he has spent working for certain company and the comments from shareholders on his 
performance shall also be taken into consideration when deciding his remunerations.  
6. Conclusion  
In 2012, Chong Qian Beer Vaccine was exposed to be a lie without any word from its 
four independent directors. That is a warning for the legislators that although the IDS 
have made a few achievements in China, its flaws shall not be ignored. It is not only 
the responsibility of the government, but also the mission of the whole community to 
keep a good environment of making and attracting investment through the perfection 
of the existing systems, if China wants to stay competitive in today’s world. 
Considering the legislation and practice in the past twenty years, to improve the IDS 
of China and eliminate conflicts with other systems, especially BOS, Chinese 
corporate governance improvement is really urgent. And such system, as the essential 
part of the improvement, shall be optimized frequently. The efforts shall be made 
mainly from the next perspectives: First, from the practice of the present law, the 
qualifications and disqualifications of independent directors shall be strictly observed. 
Second, from the completion of legislation, especially the methods of giving 
encouragement and punishment to independent directors on the basis of their different 
performances and a definite clarification between the functions of BOS and IDS shall 
be drafted. Third, from the preparations and technologies used in elections, a 
committee of minor shareholders shall be organized, and the way of online voting 
shall be applied. Fourth, from the mental independence of directors, their 
independence can be maintained through the name lists of potential independent 
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directors made by CSRC and timely dismissal or transformation. All of the measures 
above are aiming at enlarging positive effects of Chinese IDS, because better systems 
bring better corporate governance. And the ultimate goal is to guard the interests of 
minority shareholders, namely common people, which is very purpose of the modern 
Chinese corporate system reform. 
